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Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers whose effect "may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly," in
any line of commerce.1 In applying this Act, the Supreme Court has
seemed to give judicial recognition to the economic view that "the rela-
tive size distribution of firms in particular markets is an important
clue, often the single most important one, to the nature of the com-
petitive process in them." 2 Both the Court and the Federal Trade
Commission have come to rely increasingly on numerical measures of
concentration in appraising the competitive character of an industry
A standard for measuring economic concentration has thus emerged
as a first requirement of a rational anti-merger policy.
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1. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). This article is concerned principally with horizontal mergers.
Although conglomerate mergers are probably statistically the single most important type,
the significant role which horizontal mergers continue to play may be gauged from the
estimate that in the period 1959-1961 more than one-third of all workers in firms ab-
sorbed by merger were involved in horizontal acquisitions. See U.S. BuRAu OF "iE CE.%sus,
AcqusrroNs AND DsLosmAs OF MANUFACrURING FACrnEs (1959-1962) U.S. BuREAu or rHE
CENsus, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MANuFACrURES (1962). For a recent statistical overview of the
"record level" of merger activity by which 1,893 firms were acquired in 1965, see Federal
Trade Commission, News Release, February 11, 1966.
2. Statement of Carl Kaysen, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 543 (195).
3. The leading cases are: United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 38. U.S. 901 (1906);
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v,. Continental Can
Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 US. 271
(1964); United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
The spectrum of firm sizes in an industry has also played a key role in government
reports dealing with the merger problem and the level of competition. See, e.g., Nint
REPORT OF THE ATroRNEY GENERAL ON COMPETITION IN THE SYNTIIEIC RUno1rE INDU3MY
(1963); FTC, ECONOMIC INQUIRY INTO FOOD MARKETING, PART II, TatE Fnozan Fnurr,
JuICE AND VEcrEABLE INDUSTRY (1962) and PART III, Tim CANNED FRuIT, JuIcE AND
VEGErABLE INDusTmY (1965); FTC, EcoNmtc REPORT ON MRERS AND VERTICAL IN Trcx r1o.
IN THE CE1MENT INnUSMY (1966).
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Measures of concentration are designed to reduce figures portraying
the sizes of firms in a market into a single figure summarizing the
degree of concentration of that market. This compression of data in-
evitably results in the loss of certain information. The nature and
significance of the loss depend on the type of summary, and the pur-
pose for which the measure is used. There is, consequently, little right
or wrong in the abstract about a measure of concentration; its "cor-
rectness" depends entirely on its context.4
In Clayton Act merger cases, lawyers and judges have generally re-
lied on a measure of economic concentration known as the concen-
tration ratio. The structure of this ratio is so simple and intuitively
appealing that there has never been a satisfactory analysis of its utility
for resolving antitrust issues. This omission has become increasingly
important as the Court has come to rely more heavily on economic
statistics interpreted through concentration ratios. Other measures of
concentration, however, have significantly different attributes which
may impel different results. In the absence of analysis, it cannot be
assumed that the concentration ratio or any other measure will rightly
serve the policies of the antitrust laws.
In this article we examine various methods of measuring concen-
tration for Clayton Act purposes. We suggest that none of the methods
now in use fulfills the requirements of the law. Rather, we propose
a new measure of economic concentration, intended to express more
accurately the relationship between market structure and competition
which is crucial to the Clayton Act merger cases. We have called this
an entropy measure of concentration because it formally resembles a
measure of entropy-the degree of molecular disorder in a gas-
which is used in a branch of physics known as the kinetic theory of
gases. Perhaps this formal resemblance reflects some underlying simi-
larity between molecular and economic disorder. In this article, how-
ever, we view the connection with physics only as a coincidence which
furnishes a name. The justification of the measure presented here
in no way depends on any deeper substantive connection.
The entropy measure of concentration is derived from theoretical
considerations relating the number and sizes of firms in a market to
4. If, for example, sizes of individual firms are expressed as percentages of market, a
firm which has ten customers out of a market of one hundred, and a firm which has one
hundred customers out of a market of one thousand, will both be labeled 10 per cent
firms. There is nothing wrong with this formulation if the sipnificant fact is relative
size in a market. The percentage measure is misleading only if absolute size is more
important; if it is, the second firm should be treated as ten times larger than the first,
rather than its equal.
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the degree of competition anticipated for that market. This derivation
requires a more sophisticated mathematical argument than is common
in the law or is necessary to understand other methods of measure-
ment which lack theoretical underpinning. The mathematical tech-
niques by which this argument is expressed may be regarded by some
lawyers and judges with trepidation-as an appeal to some ultima
thule of the mind. From the traditional legal point of view mathe-
matical analysis may seem alien in spirit, without compelling history
and without those congenial guides of common sense and intuition
upon which so much of legal decision depends. In part this is a prob-
lem of familiarity. The symbolism may be more baffling and the chains
of reasoning more involved, but complex mathematical methods are
not essentially different from their simpler counterparts-such as per-
centages-which have enjoyed a wide use in the law. We venture
beyond elementary methods because developments in the merger law
have outrun them. The result of this effort is, we believe, an instru-
ment of measurement better suited than existing measures to the
judgments required by the Clayton Act.
II.
Concentration Ratio Tests-Horizontal Mergers
The measure of economic concentration most frequentiy used by
lawyers and economists in the horizontal merger cases is the concen-
tration ratio. This is a percentage figure representing the aggregate
market share of a given number of leading firms in an industry.5, Thus
if the first two firms in an industry control, respectively, 30 and 10
per cent of the market, the two-firm concentration ratio for that mar-
ket is 40 per cent. Economic trends and individual mergers have been
assessed in terms of these ratios and by considering changes in the
number of firms in the relevant lines of commerce. The concentration
ratio most commonly used by economists is the aggregate market
percentage of the top four firms, although concentration ratios based
on different numbers of firms are not uncommon. For purposes of
illustration, we employ a four-firm ratio.
5. For studies involving the application of concentration ratios to various industries,
see, e.g., U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, CoNcENTRATiooN RATIOS LN MANurAcruFNO I,-
DusTRIEs (1963); Shepherd, Trends of Concentration in American Manufacturing
Industries, 1947-1958, 46 R-v. OF ECON. & STATISTICs 20D (1964) and articles died therein
at note 2. For a discussion of some of the limitations of concentration ratios and other
measures see NATIONAL BuREAu OF EcoNomie RESEARCH, BUSINES. CONc wMT ION AND
PRIcE PoLicy (1955); Adelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concentration, 33 Pa-.
oF ECON. & STATinSTCS 269 (1951).
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We begin the analysis by observing that the value of the four-firm
ratio changes only when any of the four firms grows or declines rela-
tive to any firm in the industry outside the top four. The ratio does
not reflect changes in the market shares of the four leading firms when
their aggregate market share remains unchanged, or changes involv-
ing the market share of the remaining firms when their aggregate
market share remains unchanged. Yet these changes can be of con-
siderable economic importance. Two industries may show the same
ratio, even though in the first the top four firms are of equal size,
while one huge firm dominates the second. Similarly, the remaining
market may be divided among few or many firms. The competitive
behavior of firms in a market with eight equal firms, usually con-
sidered an oligopoly, will probably differ greatly from that in a market
with a hundred firms even if in both cases the first four firms have
a 50 per cent share.
An additional defect of the concentration ratio is that the number
of included firms is altogether arbitrary. A gain by firm five at
the expense of firm ten would not change a four-firm ratio but
would be reflected if five firms were included. But there is no reason
to suppose that the fate of firm four should be given full significance
and that of firm five none. Whatever number of firms included in the
concentration ratio, we are led to some such unreasonable hypothesis,
since there is no argument by which any particular number of firms
is to be preferred. Because it thus reflects only a limited, arbitrarily
chosen class of size changes, the concentration ratio is a poor method
for measuring trends in concentration.
The use of a concentration ratio to measure a single change in firm
sizes resulting from an acquisition presents other difficulties. First, as
the Court has used it, the ratio does not accurately reflect the decrease
in competition resulting from an acquisition. To illustrate this assume
a line of commerce with ten competing firms each with 10 per cent
of the market. One firm turns predator and acquires, successively, the
other nine. How should the significance of these acquisitions be
measured? The Court has approached problems of this type by com-
puting both the absolute increase (i.e., the number of percentage
points added) and the percentage increase in the ratio. In our example,
if the concentration ratio is defined by the percentage share of the
predator firm, then every acquisition increases the ratio by the same
absolute amount-ten percentage points-which becomes a smaller
percentage increase of the ratio as the size of the leading firm grows.
As a result of the first acquisition the ratio increases from 10 to 20
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per cent, a 100 per cent increase. When our predator firm acquires
its last rival, the ratio increases from 90 to 100 per cent, an increase
of only 11 per cent.
This result, however, is inconsistent with the likely effect of these
acquisitions on competition. The first acquisition which leaves eight
competitors in the field surely hurts competition less than the last,
which eliminates the final competitor. The ratio test, in effect, rewards
bigness; the larger the acquiring firm the smaller the percentage change
resulting from an acquisition. Whatever the economic truth may be,
it is clear that the change in the concentration ratio fails to give effect
to the teaching of the Court in several recent cases that the greater the
degree of concentration the smaller the permissible increase.0
A second basic difficulty arises in connection with the number of
firms included in the ratio. When used to reflect the result of a single
acquisition, the ratio must be computed from the aggregate market
share of the acquiring firm and of the firms larger than it. The acquir-
ing firm must be included; othenvise the ratio will not change as a
result of the acquisition. Firms smaller than the acquiring firm must
be excluded, or an acquisition by the acquiring firm will not be
distinguishable from an acquisition by one of the included smaller
firms.
As a result, the number of included firms must vary from case to
case making it impossible to use a predetermined number for measur-
ing all acquisitions. Since comparisons cannot validly be drawn be-
6. In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the Court
invalidated a merger of the second and third largest banks in the Philadelphia area. The
defendants argued that there would be no increase in concentration if consideration vere
restricted to the first three banks before the merger. In purportedly answering this argu-
ment the Court established, in a footnote, an important principle:
If this argument were valid, then once a market had become unduly concentrated,
further concentration would be legally privileged. On the contrary, it concentration
is already great, the importance of preventing even slight increases in concentration
and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great.
Id. at 365 n.42.
The footnote in Philadelphia Bank became the basis for decision in United States v.
Aluminum Company of America, 377 U.S. 271, 279 (1964). In this case the Court
invalidated the acquisition by Alcoa of the stock and assets of Rome Cable, a corporation
which produced various wire and cable products and accessories. The Court determined
that bare and insulated aluminum conductor was the relevant line of commerce. In
this market Alcoa was the leader, with a market share of 27.8 per cent, while Rome was
ninth with 1.3 per cent. The Court found that in this market the first two companies
controlled 50 per cent of the market; the first five companies 76 per cent; and the first
nine companies 95.7 per cent. It thus concluded that "the line of commerce showed
highly concentrated markets, dominated by a few companies but served also by a small,
though diminishing group of independents." The case was then decided on the authority
of the Philadelphia Bank footnote.
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tween concentration ratios based on differing numbers of firms, com-
parability of result is destroyed and with it the possibility of stare
decisis.7
The lack of comparability may affect the issues considered by a court.
In the Alcoa case, for example, two lines of commerce were asserted by
the Government-insulated aluminum conductor and a wider line
of insulated and bare aluminum conductor. In the insulated line
Alcoa was third with 11.6 per cent of market. Rome, the firm it ac-
quired, held 4.7 per cent. In the wider line of aluminum conductor
Alcoa was first with 27.8 per cent of market, while Rome held 1.3
per cent. In which proposed line of commerce was the merger more
significant? In the absence of a measure leading to comparable results
for both mergers, the Supreme Court rested its decision on the effect
of the acquisition in the wider line. The merger probably appeared
worse in that setting since it involved the leader of an industry. The
Court thus assumed that insulated and bare aluminum properly con-
stituted a single line of commerce. As the dissenters pointed out, this
was a dubious proposition for which there was no evidence in the
record. In fact the issue was irrelevant since, as we shall demonstrate,
the merger's anti-competitive effects were probably more significant
in the narrower than in the wider market.8
The concentration ratio thus has fundamental defects when used
to measure either economic trends or the effects of a single horizontal
7. To illustrate this, assume that the leading firm in an industry holds 50 per cent of
the market and acquires the second firm which holds 25 per cent. The concentration ratio
measured by the leading firm has increased from 50 to 75 per cent. Now assume that
the first two firms hold 25 and 25 per cent respectively and the second firm acquires n
third firm which also holds 25 per cent. In this case the two-firm concentration ratio rises
from 50 to 75 per cent just as the single-firm concentration ratio did in the first case,
yet the two mergers are statistically very different.
8. Comparisons were also important in United States v. Manufacturers Hanover, 240
F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), where the Government claimed that the merger between
Manufacturers Trust Co. and The Hanover Bank should be invalidated on the basis of
the statistical evidence alone in light of Philadelphia Bank. The Court had found in
Philadelphia Bank that the merger would result in a significant increase in concentration.
It based this conclusion on the fact that before the merger the first and second banks
controlled 44 per cent of the market, and that if the merger were permitted the first and
second banks (the merging banks being two and three) would control 59 per cent of the
market. "Plainly," the Court concluded, "we think this increase of more than 33%
in concentration must be regarded as significant." Since the merger in Philadelphia Bank
involved the second and third banks in the area, the concentration ratio could consist of
the aggregate shares of not more than the first two banks. In Manufacturers Hanover,
however, the merger was between banks five and eight in the New York City area. The
concentration ratio for this market would necessarily include not less than five banks,
Consequently a comparison of the statistics in these cases using a concentration ratio was
not possible. Instead the district court concluded that the merger in Philadelphia Bank
was worse than in Manufacturers Hanover because the relative size of the merged banks
was greater in the first case than in the second. While this comparison is relevant, It does
not take into account significant information from the remainder of the market.
682
An Entropy Theory
merger. In measuring trends its value depends on a narrow, arbitrarily
chosen class of economic changes which of necessity tell only part of
the story. In measuring the effects of a single acquisition it either
overstates their significance when the market is concentrated, or under-
states their significance when the market is not concentrated, or both.
Moreover, the results must be cast in terms of such limited compara-
bility as virtually to destroy the usefulness of the measure as a unify-
ing index of the significance of acquisitions.
Percentage Foreclosure Tests-Vertical Mergers
Similar problems appear in measuring the significance of vertical
mergers. Vertical integration may be accomplished either permanently
by merger or temporarily by contract. In the first case legality under
the Clayton Act turns on the applicability of Section 7, and in the
second on the applicability of Section 3, which prohibits exclusive ar-
rangements, such as requirements contracts, where their result "may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce." 9
Although Sections 3 and 7 use similar language, their governing
principles are not identical. Under Section 3, as a result of the Standard
Stations decision,10 a determination that a requirements contract, for
example, is likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition
depends primarily on the degree of market foreclosure resulting from
the contract. If foreclosure is quantitatively substantial, a violation of
Section 3 would be established. In Standard Stations the Court found
requirements contracts illegal which foreclosed 6.7 per cent of an ex-
tremely large market.
Regardless of any differences of interpretation, the percentage of fore-
closure is undoubtedly relevant in determining whether there has been
a substantial lessening of competition, just as the combined percentage
of market of the merging firms is relevant when horizontal mergers are
considered. To the extent of the foreclosure, competitive firms are cut
off from customers and vice versa. But to determine whether the fore-
closure has been substantial a court must consider the degree of concen-
9. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
10. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1919). The quanti-
tative substantiality approach to vertical mergers was in evidence when the FTC
recently anounced that it would attack vertical acquisitions in the cement industry where
the acquired company was a ready-mixed concrete firm ranked among the first four
non-integrated producers in any metropolitan market, or was a cement consumer
purchasing 50,000 or more barrels of cement annually. FTC, Commission Enforcement
Policy with Respect to Vertical Mergers in the Cement Industry, 1 TRADE Rtc. Rw.
4510.
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tration (and foreclosure) in the remainder of the market, a factor which
the percentage foreclosure test does not take into account. In the pro-
posed Bethlehem-Youngstown merger one vertical aspect of the case
arose from the fact that Youngstown was an independent producer of
rope wire, a product used in the manufacture of wire rope by Bethle-
hem among others. The threatened foreclosure was approximately 10
per cent. In holding this substantial, the court, in United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.," relied on the additional fact that there were
only five other independent producers of rope wire. It found the per-
centage foreclosure significant in light of the high degree of concen-
tration in the remainder of the market.
There is another disadvantage to the percentage foreclosure test.
Although theoretically measuring the same thing-a substantial lessen-
ing of competition-the percentage foreclosure test for vertical inte-
grations and the concentration ratio test for horizontal acquisitions
do not lead to results which can be compared. In justifying its con-
clusion in Philadelphia Bank that an increase of 33 per cent in
concentration was substantial, the Court cited Standard Stations
and other vertical integration cases where the percentage foreclosure
was less than 33 per cent. The comparison however was misplaced.
The percentage foreclosure test measures the degree to which the
market has shrunk for the remaining competitive firms. The change
in the concentration ratio measures the growth in the size of a firm.
Although in both cases results may be expressed in percentage terms,
they measure different things. Thus a 5 per cent foreclosure is not
analogous to a 5 per cent increase in a concentration ratio. A lack of
comparability thus appears inherent in tests dependent on concen-
tration ratios and between such tests and percentage foreclosure tests.
It may be argued that the failure of these measures to take account
of economically significant facts may be remedied by considering those
facts on a separate basis. For example, if concentration ratios do not
reflect changes in the number of firms, those changes can be stated
independently. But this does not solve the problem. If significant mat-
ters are considered separately, there is no way of deciding how their
effects should be combined and, if conflicting in their impetus, how
that conflict should be resolved.' 2 The solution requires a unitary
11. 168 F. Supp. 576, 611-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
12. A conflict of factors was present in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 884 U.S,
270 (1966), where the district court found that concentration had decreased because
the aggregate percentage of the top firms had declined, while the Supreme Court
concluded au contraire that concentration had increased because the number of firms
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measure which combines the effect of all relevant factors and which
expresses that result in a form which is useful for the economic judg-
ments required of a court.
Alternative Legal Rules
Some lawyers and economists have suggested that a unitary measure
could be created by pruning the statistical tree to a single branch.
They have proposed that a merger should be deemed prima facie
unlawful if the market shares of the merged firms exceed a given
percentage. 13 Few commentators, however, have suggested that a merger
which produces a firm with less than such a percentage should be
conclusively valid. It is more usual to find the opinion that in such
cases an examination of all factors is required. This reservation se-
verely limits the usefulness of the rules since important cases fre-
quently involve small percentages.1 4
had declined. Id. at 273 n3. Neither court attempted to reach a conclusion based on
a weighing of both sets of factors.
13. See, e.g., Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division II, 75 YArx L.J. 377 (1966); KAYSEN & TurxarR, Awrimusr Poucy 133
(1959); Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 176 (1955).
Professor Stigler, for example, would establish presumptions whereby mergers which
create a firm with less than 5 to 10 per cent of the market would be sanctioned while
mergers which created a firm with more than 20 per cent would be disapproved. In
between, legality would turn on other factors. Stigler, supra at 182.
The Federal Trade Commission recently announced that mergers by retail food chains
or voluntary and cooperative groups of food retailers which created an enterprise with a
sales volume in excess of $500 million raised "sufficient questions regarding their legal
status to warrant attention and consideration by the Commission ... ." The Commision
added, however, that lesser mergers could also pose a threat to competition and that
such a threat would be present whenever leaders who were direct competitors in metro-
politan markets sought to merge. FTC, Commission Enforcement Policy with Respect to
Mergers in Food Distribution Industries, I TRADE 1rc. RE. S 452-0.
14. Two recent Supreme Court decisions are notable examples. In United States v.
Von's Grocery Company, 384 U.S. 270 (1966), the Court held that the acquisition in 1960
by Von's Grocery Company of Shopping Bag Food Stores, both large retail supermarket
chains in Los Angeles, violated Section 7. Though even after the merger Von's controlled
only 7.5 per cent of the Los Angeles grocery market, the Court concluded that the
acquisition was illegal because both Von's and Shopping Bag were successful and
expanding companies and because the relevant market, though not yet concentrated, -as
"characterized by a long and continuous trend toward fewrer and fewer competitors." The
Court cited facts showing that the number of single store owners had declined and that
the share of chains had increased as a result of acquisitions which were continuing at a
rapid rate. This was, the Court felt, the very sort of trend Congress had declared "must
be arrested."
In the second case, United States v. Pabst Brewing Company, 384 U.S. 901 (1966), the
Court reversed a dismissal of -he Government's action against the acquisition by Pabst
Brewing Company of Blatz' Brewing Company, holding that the Government's evidence
was "amply sufficient" to show a violation of Section 7. At the opening of 1958, the year
of the merger, Pabst was the tenth largest brewer in the country and Blatz the eighteenth.
The acquisition made Pabst the fifth largest brewer with 4.49 per cent of total industry
sales. By 1961, three years after the merger, Pabst's share of the national beer market was
still only 5.83 per cent.
Under a rule such as Stigler's, see note 13 supra, the Court would have approved the
mergers in both Von's and Pabst since the firms resulting from both mergers had less
than 10 per cent of the market.
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The critical point in rules of this type is that they consign to irrele-
vance most of the factors which the Court has held important in
deciding Clayton Act cases. They focus instead on a single element,
the size of the merged firms. Consequently, whatever the percentage
selected as the determining point of illegality, it is easy to construct
examples illustrating the perversity of result which would follow the
faithful application of any such rule. And it is the coup de grace for
such proposals that they afford no way of measuring the trends in con-
centration, which have played such a large role in these cases.
Professor Bok of Harvard has proposed a more discriminating set
of rules. He has suggested that the prohibitions of Section 7 be ap-
plied to any acquisition "resulting in an appreciable increase in the
superiority of the leader's size over the margin of leadership which
he enjoyed in the base period," and he has urged that any increase
of more than a few percentage points should be viewed as "appre-
ciable."' , With respect to acquisitions by a firm other than the leader,
Professor Bok offers a rule based on the concentration ratio of up to
eight firms. If this ratio shows an increase of more than seven to eight
percentage points from a base period, the merger should be prohibited
because the industry has demonstrated a tendency to oligopoly which
the statute was designed to arrest.1 6
Apart from the arbitrary nature of the particular percentages chosen,
the principal problem with this set of rules is that they do not depend
on the degree of economic concentration in the industry. This is im-
portant because the greater the concentration in a market the smaller
the legally permissible increase in the leader's share or that of any
number of leading firms.
Professor Bok's reliance on the aggregate market share of the lead-
ing firms (up to eight) involves the use of the familiar concentration
ratio, and is subject to the objections already discussed. He attempts to
meet at least one of these objections by claiming that changes in the
number of firms should not be viewed as significant since the presence
of marginal firms has little effect on competition. Clearly the Court
thinks otherwise-as evidenced by the stress placed on the total num-
ber of firms in an industry in the recent Von's and Pabst decisions.11
There appears to be no legal justification for considering less than
15. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 HARv. L. REV. 226, 308 (1960).
16. Id. at 313.
17. See note 14 supra. Of course, defendants are still free to prove if they can that
disappearing firms were in fact marginal and consequently not significant for competition.
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all the available information concerning the number and relative sizes
of firms in a line of commerce. The failure of Professor Bok's concen-
tration ratio to take such facts into account is a shortcoming which
reflects the general limitations of this class of measures.
Econometric Methods
In studying the distribution of wealth in a population economists
have frequently used indices based on the average difference in wealth
of its members. Differing functions have dressed this fundamental
variable in a number of related fashions.' 8
The earliest method, developed by M. 0. Lorenz in 1905, measures
distribution of income in a population by plotting the cumulated
percentage of the population against the cumulated percentage of
wealth or income of that population." The resulting "Lorenz" curve
is a straight diagonal if the distribution is equal and becomes more
bowed as concentration increases.
The curve was given a more useful, numerical expression in 1912
by Corrado Gini. Gini proposed an index of concentration based on
the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal line
of equal distribution divided by the total area under the diagonal.
Thus as the distribution of firm sizes moves from equality to inequal-
ity the ratio moves from zero to one. This ratio, called the Gini
coefficient, is a function of the average difference of market shares of
every possible pair of firms in the industry. It has been widely used
by economists to measure what is commonly called relative concen-
tration-the degree to which firm sizes differ.21 But the Gini coefficient
does not measure the degree of absolute concentration-the extent
to which economic power has gravitated into a few hands. It is zero
whether an industry is divided among two or a hundred firms, so long
as the division is equal. In general the coefficent will not change as
a result of a change in the number of firms so long as the same per-
centage of firms controls the same percentage of market. This feature
18. The literature on this subject is collected in Singer, The Structure of Industrial
Concentration Indexes, 10 ANTRusr BuLL. 75 (1965).
19. Lorenz, Methods of Measuring the Concentration of Wealth, 70 Am. STATITcAL
Assoc. J. 1 (1905).
20. Gmni, V- ung.A - MUErAnLTAA 19 (1912).
21. If there are three firms, A, B, and C, the Gini coefficient would be a function of the
average of the differences (A-B), (A-C) and (B-C). WoYrMsKv, EL,'NLcrS AiD SoCIAL
SEcuM IN nME UN rrE STATES 251 (1943). More precisely, the Gini coefficient is equal to
the sum of the differences between every pair of firms divided by two times the number
of pairs of firms and this divided by the mean firm size.
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severely limits its usefulness as a tool for administering the antitrust
laws.22
In fact any measure based on some average of the size differences
between firms, while appropriate for measuring inequality of wealth,
is unsuitable for measuring economic concentration. Since any such
measure is based on differences in firm sizes, the entry or exit of a
firm causes a dramatic change in value; the smaller the firm the greater
the change. This is misleading because the presence or absence of a
firm of negligible size does not significantly alter the degree of com-
petition in the market. The difference is that in measuring the distri-
bution of wealth we are concerned with the economic status of each
individual, while in measuring competition we care only about the
contribution of each firm to the level of competitive activity in the
market as a whole. A firm which is too small to change this level
should be ignored.
Other measures based on the sum of the squares of firm sizes have
been proposed by Herfindahl and Niehans.23 These indices are superior
to those discussed earlier in that they reflect both relative and absolute
concentration and are not dramatically affected by the entry or exit
of a firm of negligible size. Nevertheless they have other attributes
which limit their usefulness for the law. Discussion of these problems,
however, is best deferred until we have developed the entropy measure.
22. There is also no reason to suppose (although the fallacy is not apparent) that
the Gini coefficient will correctly reflect changes in competition when the number of firms
remains constant but their relative sizes change. The coefficient, for example, would treat
a market of 4 firms with, respectively, 30 per cent, 30 per cent, 30 per cent, 10 per cent
shares as having the same degree of concentration as a market whose four firms have
40 per cent, 20 per cent, 20 per cent, 20 per cent shares. While this may be a correct
result there is nothing in Gini's theory to support the conclusion that these markets
will probably be equally competitive.
23. Niehans, An Index of the Size of Industrial Establishments, 8 INT'L ECON. PArER,
122 (1958); Herfindahl, Concentration in the Steel Industry, 1950 (Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University).
A method more recently suggested for appraising the degree of economic concentra.
tion is the standard measure of dispersion used by statisticians; this is the variance.
It is defined as the sum of the squares of the deviations of items (e.g., percentages of
market) from the arithmetic mean item (e.g., the arithmetic mean percentage) divided
by the number of items (e.g., firms). It is apparent from this definition that the variance
shares the limitations of the Gini coefficient. Like the Gini coefficient it does not measure
absolute concentration, it changes dramatically with the appearance or disappearance
of a small firm, and its measurement of relative concentration lacks any theoretical con-
nection with the degree of competition.
For a discussion of the use of a variance which makes use of the logarithms of the sizes
of firms see Hart & Prais, The Analysis of Business Concentration: A Statistical Approach,
119 J. oF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL Soc'Y ser. A, pt. I, at 150 (1956); Simon & Bonil, The
Size Distribution of Business Firms, 48 AM. EcoN. Rav. 607 (1958). The use of the log
variance grew out of an effort to describe theoretically the basis of the distribution of





In enacting the Celler-Kefauver amendment to Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, Congress expressed concern with the social and political
implications of concentration as well as with its economic effects. The
relationship of bigness to the social and political ills which Congress
sought to avoid is too generalized to lead to any particular measure
of economic concentration. The relationship, however, between eco-
nomic concentration and competition provides a more informative
guide. Our effort will be to construct a measure which reflects the
minimum competitive effort firms will believe necessary to hold their
customers as a function of the number and sizes of competing firms.
We begin handicapped by the discouraging but inescapable fact
that economic knowledge is not sufficiently advanced to enable us to
predict the degree of competitive activity in a market even if all avail-
able economic evidence is considered. A fortiori, given information
concerning solely the number and relative sizes of competing firms, we
cannot say that such a market will be x times more competitive than
another with a different spectrum of firms. Yet the law, which presents
the test of a "substantial lessening" of competition, requires that some
such comparison be made.
How may the legal requirements be met within the limits of
economic knowledge? There is no mathematical answer to this ques-
tion. But certainly the numbers should play no more than the mini-
mum role required by legal theory: they should formulate an economic
statement which so reduces the scope of judgment as to determine the
economic issue in the more extreme merger cases; in the closer cases
the formulation should permit the numbers to be used as an im-
portant element together with other evidence. In addition, these eco-
nomic statements should be cast in a form which permits comparisons
between cases for purposes of stare decisis.
To fulfill these requirements, we propose a measure which trans-
lates any market into a market deemed to have an equivalent level
of competitive activity but consisting solely of firms which have equal
shares of market. We call such a market an equal-firm market. The
effect of this translation is to reduce the problem of comparing states
of market with differing numbers of unequal firms to the narrower
problem of comparing equal-firm markets. The significance of the
difference between equal-firm markets is not determined by a trans-
lation measure. Thus a market found equivalent to one with eight
equal firms is not necesarily twice as competitive as a market equiva-
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lent to one with four equal firms. In fact, the meaning of the difference
may vary from case to case. In closer cases, therefore, where the precise
significance of the difference may become important, additional eco-
nomic evidence will be essential to any decision.
The entropy measure we derive here is but one of a number of
possible equal-firm translation measures of the type described. We show
three independent derivations of the entropy measure and then con-
sider some alternative translation measures.
A "Competitive Activities" Derivation
We assume that it is possible to define certain activities of a firm
as competitive and to speak of the degree to which a firm engages in
such activities. Economists have described competitive activities as
those which are determined by the market. In a perfectly competitive
market all activities would be determined in the sense that market
conditions would dictate every move. Conversely, in a perfect monop-
oly the controlling firm would have perfect freedom. The total of all
competitive activities in a market may be thought of as the sum total
of the competitive activities of each firm. If the firms in a market are
all equal in size, each will contribute equally to the total. One may
quarrel with these ideas, but the legal standard-"a substantial less-
ening of competition"-implies some conception of levels of com-
petitive activity.
The foregoing conceptions can be expressed symbolically in the
following way. If f(n) is a function which describes the degree of
competitive activity in a market consisting of n equal firms, then the
contribution of each firm to f(n) is, since all are equal, 1 /n f(n). If, for
example, there are four equal firms in a market then:
f(4) = 4 f(4) + 1/ f(4) + 1/4 f(4) + 4 f(4)
We now make a far-reaching assumption: the minimum com-
petitive effort a firm will undertake to retain its customers is a function
solely of its percentage share of the market. Or, putting the same
thought in a different way, the total competitive threat to a firm with
a given percentage of market is constant no matter how the remaining
market is divided. The underlying conception on which this assump-
tion rests is that large firms constitute a proportionately greater threat
than small firms and therefore the total competitive danger from a
few large firms is equivalent to the total competitive danger from a
greater number of proportionately smaller firms. This is admittedly a
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speculative assumption, but one which is at least not inconsistent with
economic knowledge and which need only be generally and not pre-
cisely true in order to be useful.
If this assumption is accepted, then the contribution each firm makes
to the total degree of competitive activity will be equal to the contri-
bution that firm would make in a market otherwise identical but
composed solely of firms equal to it in size. Thus the contribution
of a 50 per cent firm in any market would be Y f(2), the contribution of
a 20 per cent firm would be % f(5) and in general the contribution of a
firm which controlled 1 /nth of a market would be 1/n f(n). Denote the
percentage share of the first firm by 1/n, the percentage share of the
second firm by 1/n2, etc. Then the total degree of competitive activity
in the market is: l/n, f(n) + /n2 (n2) ... l/,n f(n.).
We say that two markets are equivalent if they have the same total
competitive activity. Given any market we seek to determine an equiv-
alent equal-firm market. The entropy measure, which we denote by
C, is the number of firms in this equivalent market.
It follows that:
f(C) = l/n, f(ni) + /n2f(72) )... + 1/n. (n.)
When all firms are equal in size then:
f(C) =f(n)
C n
We now consider the problem of determining f(n). We approach
this by examining the way f(n) should change as the market (or a fixed
percentage segment of it) becomes divided among a larger number of
equal firms.
What can be said about the way f(n) should increase as n increases?
If a single firm controls an entire market, dividing it in two will
obviously increase greatly the level of competitive activity since there
will be some competition where none existed before. The increase in
value of f(n) should be correspondingly great. But if there are 100
equal firms dividing a market, the addition of a single firm will obvi-
ously be far less significant for competition; consequently the increase
in f(n) should be correspondingly smaller. These considerations lead
us to adopt the general principle that as n grows larger f(n) should
increase but at a diminishing rate.
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There are an infinite number of functions which have this charac-
teristic. Economic theory or legal principle cannot be expected to deter-
mine a unique choice; arbitrary elements are inevitable in any
conclusion.
The first decision is whether f(n) should increase without bound
as n increases or whether there should be some upper value for f(n)
beyond which it never rises no matter how large n becomes. In eco-
nomic terms, the question raised is whether competition should be
deemed to increase without limit as the number of firms increases.
Or, stated differently, should small firms be viewed as significant
contributors to competition? Our affirmative answer is suggested by
the fact that in both Von's and Pabst the Court treated the disappear-
ance of extremely small firms (those with less than .001 per cent of
market) as significant for competition. In view of this, and in the
absence of compelling economics to the contrary, we make a tentative
decision in favor of functions which treat small firms as significant.
We thus require that f(n) should increase without bound (although
at a diminishing rate) as n increases. The opposite decision on this
issue leads to an alternative measure which is considered in Part IV.
There are two important classes of functions which increase without
bound at a diminishing rate. These differ in the importance they
assign to small firms. In the first class are the "fractional power func-
tions," so called because n is raised to some fractional power between
0 and 1. Thus (n) = nalb. Probably the most familiar function of this
type is f(n) = n%6 which means that f(n) is equal to the square root of
the number of equal firms.
The fractional power functions assign great significance to small
firms. To see this consider the effect on f(n) of doubling the number
of firms in a market. A doubling yields the ratio f(2n) /f(n) = 2a1b. The
importance of this result is that 2a/1 is a constant independent of n.
Thus if a fractional power function is used, doubling the number of
firms will have the same proportional significance for competition
regardless of the number of firms with which we started.
This result indicates that the fractional power functions probably
overstate the significance of an increase in the number of firms.
Doubling the number of firms in a market from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 4
should lead to a greater proportional increase in competition than
doubling the number of firms from 1000 to 2000. Generally it seems
probable that a doubling in the number of firms should result in a
diminishing proportional increase in f(n) as n increases. Since the
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fractional power functions assign equal significance to all doublings
we reject this class of functions as candidates for f(n).
The other class consists of the logarithmic functions.24 The simplest
of these is f(n) = log(n) which means that f(n) is simply equal to the
logarithm of the number of equal firms. The logarithmic functions
assign less significance to an increase in the number of firms than
the fractional power functions. For example, if log n is used, doubling
the number of firms yields the ratio (log n + log 2)/log n. As n in-
creases this ratio approaches 1, which is consistent with the idea that
a doubling becomes of diminished proportional significance as the
number of firms increases. It is for this reason that we make a ten-
tative choice in favor of the logarithmic functions. This choice, which
is in substance one of policy, will in many cases favor the defendants
since it assumes a slow reduction in competitive activity as the number
of firms declines. 25 The problem of deciding which logarithmic func-
tion to use remains unsolved since there are others more complex
than log(n), such as log log n and (log n)2, which also satisfy our re-
quirements. But it is not at all clear which, if any, more complicated
logarithmic function would be justified, and the simplicity of log n
commends it as at least a leading candidate for f(n). We shall see later
that there are independent reasons for this choice.
Combining this result with our prior result yields the following:
logC= nlogn+ 1/n2 logn + 1/n3 log n3... + l/n log n,
log C = log (nil" n21i'"2 na t"3 . . . nn
C = nliflnl n Il n2 n311n .. , nilnn
This expression for C is what we propose as the entropy measure
of concentration.
Before examining the characteristics of the entropy measure, there
24. We shall use the base 10 for logarithms. This means that the logarithm is
defined as the power to which 10 must be raised to give the original number. In
symbols, 101ogn = n. Thus 102 = 100; log 100 = 2. 103 = 1000; log 1000 = 3. 101 = 10.
101-7 = 50; log 50 = 1.7. The last pair of equations is not exact. 10T is really a trifle
more than 50, and 101.699 is closer to 50 than either 10L700 or 101.08. Therefore,
log 50= 1.699, to three decimals. Tables are available giving the logarithm of any
number to five decimals, but there is no advantage in the calculations which follow
in this article to using logarithms with more than three decimals.
Certain properties of the logarithm should be kept in mind in the discussion which
follows. First, the larger the number the larger its logarithm. Second, as n increases, its
logarithm increases more and more slowly, so that n may become very large while log n
remains quite small. Thus if 7 = 1,00O,000, log n is still only 6. Third, the sum of the
logs of two numbers is equal to the log of their product.
25. For a discussion of the difference in rate of increase between the logarithmic
and power functions see 1 CouRaNT, DirEarn.r_-L ANdD IN"rEAL CALCULUS 190-93 (1937).
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is some insight to be gained by considering again, in an entirely dif-
ferent way, the problem of measuring competition in terms of the
number and sizes of firms.
A "Permutations" Derivation
We assume that the fear of losing customers, or the hope of gaining
them, is a principal motivation for competitive behavior. Where the
expectation of customer change is high, firms tend to engage in those
activities which are called competitive. Assuming generally rational
management of firms, these expectations ought to be related to the
probabilities that such customer transfers will occur. A mathematical
depiction of these probabilities which takes into account all relevant
factors is of course vastly beyond the reach of present econometrical
and mathematical sciences. The Supreme Court, however, by focusing
on the number and sizes of firms, has already suggested the limits of
our inquiry. It would be consistent with the bounds of legal relevancy
to derive a mathematical expression which describes, at least in a
general way, the probabilities of gaining or losing customers as a
function of the number and sizes of firms in a market. This suggests
that the probability of customer loss (or gain) measured on this basis
could be used as a measure of competition. 0
It is a basic theorem of mathematical probability that the chance of
the occurrence of an event which can happen with equal probability
in different ways is equal to the probability of its happening in one
way times the number of ways in which it can occur. The more such
ways the more likely the event becomes. The probability of tossing
heads with a coin on both of two trials is half the probability of
tossing heads only once in two trials because the first event can only
occur in one way (heads on both tosses) while the second event can
occur in two ways (heads on either the first or second toss).
A similar principle can be applied to firms and customers. If there
are only two competing firms in an industry and only two customers,
one for each firm, each firm can lose a customer in only one way and
that is by transfer of its customer to the other firm. On the other hand,
as the number of firms and customers increases, the number of dif-
ferent ways customers can transfer also increases. If other things are
26. The use of methods drawn from the mathematical theory of probabilities is not
unknown in connection with the analysis of measures of concentration. See, e.g., State-
ment of Professor Leonard W. Weiss, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 728 (1965).
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equal, it seems reasonable to assign a greater probability of customer
transfer to a market where such changes can occur in a larger number
of ways. This suggests that competition be measured as a function of
the number of possible customer transfers.2 7
A customer transfer can be defined most generally as a transfer of
any number of customers from any number of firms to any number
of firms. A transfer might involve all or part of a single customer's
business and two firms or many customers and firms. Not all transfers
are equally probable. The loss by the leading firm of all its customers
is a possibility too remote to influence behavior. On the other hand,
transfers which result in not more than minor changes in firm stand-
ing are much more probable. If there is some degree of market share
stability it is arguable that the most probable transfers will be permu-
tations-i.e., those transfers which leave market shares unchanged.
An exchange of customers by two firms would be a permutation if
each firm gained the same number of customers it lost (within some
selected period of time). Since permutations are highly probable, we
propose to use the class of permutations as representative of the entire
class of transfers. In relying on the class of permutations, we are in
effect using the number of ways a market can be churned around
within a given spectrum of firm sizes. It is our premise that the greater
the number of such ways the greater the possibility of competitive
behavior.
Obviously the validity of this derivation depends upon the assump-
tion that customers (or separable units in which purchases are made)
are either roughly equal in size, or, if different in size, are randomly
distributed among all firms. While this will not always be true, it will
be approximately true in a sufficient number of instances-e.g., all
retail store cases-to warrant the derivation.
In deriving the formula we begin with a simple example. Assume
a market with only two firms and four customers. In the first situation
firm A has three of the customers and firm B has the fourth. How many
different permutations of customers are there which will presen,e the
three-to-one ratio? The answer is four-the one with which we started
and the three resulting from the exchange by firm A of any one of
its customers with firm B's single customer. Suppose now the cus-
tomers are split evenly between A and B. The number of possible
permutations is then six: the one with which we started and five addi-
27. Evidence of customer transfer has been introduced in the merger cases. See, e.g.,
Brief for Appellees at 65, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 US. 271 (1964).
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tional permutations resulting from the exchange by firm A of both
its customers for both of firm B's customers; or the exchange by firm
A of each of its customers with one or the other of B's customers. The
number of permutations thus rises as the market becomes more evenly
divided. This is what we would expect if the number of permutations
were a valid measure of the degree of competitive activity.
We turn now to the more general case. If there are n firms in an
industry and the first firm has a, customers, the second firm a2 cus-
tomers, etc., the problem is to determine how many different ways
these customers may be distributed among all the firms in the market.
If the customers of the firms are arranged in a line, the customers of
firm a, first, firm a2 second, and so on, our question becomes: how
many different ways can we arrange the customers on the line? The
answer is, by a well-known formula, that if there are N distinguishable
customers the number of different arrangements is the product (N)
(N-I) (N-2) ... (1) which is abbreviated with the symbol NI ("N fac-
torial"). Since the total number of customers in our example is
a, + a, + a3 . .. -± a, the number of different permutations is
(a, + a2 + a3 ... + a,,)! Not all these permutations "count" however.
Every one involving solely a permutation of the customers of a single
firm is irrelevant. For each firm the number of such permutations is
(by the same formula) al Consequently, the total number of permu-
tations (Perm) involving intercompany exchanges is:28
Perm = (a+a 2 + a... +a,,)l
ail a2 a3! ... a,!
The number of permutations is thus a function both of the total
number of customers in a market and their distribution among the
competing firms. In most cases involving horizontal mergers the num-
ber of customers is extremely large, so large in fact that the effect on
the degree of competition of a change in the number of customers is
usually ignored. The only changes considered are those involving the
number and relative sizes of firms. Our measure then should be cast
in terms which permit us to reflect either of these changes without
also reflecting changes in the total number of customers. In addition,
the number of permutations must be converted into the form of a
translation into equal-firm markets.
28. Derivations of NI and this expression appear in HOEL, INTRODUCTION TO STATISTIC
17 (1965) and in Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the
Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HAv. L. Ray. 338, 355 n.60 (1966).
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To accomplish both these purposes let N = the total number of
customers and 1/n, = the fractional share of the first firm; 1/n 2 = the
fractional share of the second firm, and so forth. Since a, + a2 + a3 +
... + a, = N and N/ni = a,, etc. the expression previously derived
becomes by substitution:
Perm - N(N/n)! (N/n)! (Nln3)! ... (N/n.)I
When N (or any other number for that matter) is large there is an
approximation for its factorial known as Stirling's approximation
which is:29
NH
Substituting this approximation for the factorials in the expression
for Perm above and simplifying the result yields:
Perm - [n 11 "I n221/f12 n31 I13. .. 7n1 lt"]] "
If all firms are equal then:
Perm - n,,
The number of permutations is thus a function both of the n, and
N. To eliminate this dependence on N and to set our measure equal
to n for equal firm markets we let Perm = Pzy We then have:
p-. [nuinh n,11l2 n 31i.3. . . nnx/.n]'
P nhinln n21In2,n311n3 ... n,'flnn
This meets our requirements. P is dependent solely on the number
and relative sizes of firms and is equal to n when all firms are equal
in size.30 Comparing the right hand of the above expression with the
expression previously obtained for C we have the result that the "per-
mutations measure" which satisfies these requirements is identical to
the "competitive activities" measure previously derived. P = C.
A "Probabilities" Derivation
There is a third, perhaps deeper approach to the problems we have
been exploring. Here, we consider again the stability of customer-firm
29. A derivation of Stirling's approximation appears in CouRAxr, op. cit. supra note
25, at 361.
30. The entire chain of this manipulation, involving permutations, factorials,
Stirling's formula, and the elimination of the exponent N is directly analogous to the
fundamental argument in the statistical theory of gases. Mathematical details may be
found in the introductory chapters of any textbook on statistical mechanics. See, e.g.,
TER HAAR, ELEmT oF STATimcAL IcdiANics 22 (1954).
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allegiances, but this time seek to determine the probability that, given
a particular distribution of customers among firms, no firm will lose
a customer to any other firm.21
It is assumed that there is a probability that a firm in a market will
not lose a particular customer; this probability may be denoted as q±.
If this firm has a, customers and if we assume further that customers
come and go independently then the total probability that this firm
will not lose any customers is qai. Similarly, the probability (Prob)
that no firm in the market will lose any customers is:
Prob = qaiL q22 qa3. . . q an
We now confront the problem of determining the probabilities q4.
Assume for a moment that the values q, are given and we wish to
determine what distribution of numbers of customers among the firms
is most likely to be observed. It can be shown, using calculus, that
the most likely distribution occurs when the at are such that qj = a4/N
where N is the total number of customers. In words: the most likely
distribution is that in which each firm has the same fraction of the
total number of customers as it has probability of holding a single
customer. This is not unreasonable. If, for example, a firm has a 50 per
cent chance of holding each customer, that firm is most likely to hold
50 per cent of the total number of customers.
In our problem the q, are not known but the a4 are. Since we have
found that the most likely distribution occurs when the at are pro-
portional to the qj, it follows that if the a, are given, the most likely
situation is that the q, will be proportional to the given at. Thus,
q= = a,/N.
Let 1 /n, be the fraction of the market held by the first firm, etc. Then
a.,= N/n,, etc., as before, and q, = 1/n, by virtue of the argument
given above. Substituting these terms in the expression for Prob above
we have:
Prob - [(l/nj)'I1" (1/n 2)In2 (1/n 3)In3 . .. (1/),
1
[niiln1 n21/2 nailf. .. , nA llnn]
The smaller the probability that no customer will shift firm alle-
giance the greater the level of competitive activity. Thus as Prob de-
creases competition should increase. This suggests that the "proba-
bilities" measure of concentration, which we denote Q, should be
31. The argument here is also analogous to an argument used in the statistical
theory of gases. See TR HAAR, op. cit. supra note 30.
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constructed from the inverse of Prob so that Q will increase with
increasing competition. At the same time, for reasons already discussed
in connection with the permutations derivation, we take the Nth root
to eliminate the variable of the number of customers. Thus:
Q = (1/Pro b)lIN
= n 11l2i %lM2 n 3 ln3 . . I. n.nn
The probabilities derivation thus leads to the same result as the
competitive activities and permutations derivations.
Although economic theory is not adequate to establish the validity
of any measure beyond question, theoretical arguments can lend plau-
sibility to our choices; it is for this reason that we have given three
different theoretical derivations for the entropy measure. We now con-
sider whether the entropy measure leads to any probably wrong results
such as we found in examining the concentration ratio and other
measures.
Characteristics of the Entropy Measure
In order to demonstrate the characteristics of the entropy measure
as applied to horizontal mergers, we consider the same type of problem
considered earlier for the concentration ratios-the successive acqui-
sition by a predator firm of its competitors. We imagine a market with
100 equal firms. C for this market is 100. After the predator has ac-
quired 5 firms, there are 95 left; the predator with 6 per cent and 94
others with I per cent each. For this market C = 89.8. When the next
5 firms are acquired leaving a market with 90 firms, the predator has
11 per cent of the market and there are 89 others with I per cent each:
C = 76.8. The absolute decline in C as a result of the first 5 acquisitions
was 10.2. Its absolute decline after the second 5 acquisitions was 13.0.
Since the numbers of firms were reduced there was an even larger
percentage decline. As the process continues, the absolute decline
caused by the acquisition of 5 firms diminishes, because monopoly
conditions are being approached, but the percentage decline continues
to grow. Thus when the predator firm controls 51 per cent of the
market, C = 13.5 and when it controls 56 per cent, C = 10.5. This is
an absolute decline of only 3.0 but a percentage decline of about 29
per cent These results seem more closely related to the probable
changes in competition than the changes in the concentration ratio
which, it may be recalled, showed identical absolute increases and
diminished percentage increases as the process continued.
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The entropy measure declines as the result of an acquisition because
the market shares of the merging firms are combined into a single firm.
If two 10 per cent firms merge, their contribution to f(C) declines from
2/10 log (10) to 1/5 log (5). Since log (5) is less than log (10) we have in
effect said that the total degree of competitive activity of two 10 per
cent firms is greater than the total degree of such activity on the part of
a single 20 per cent firm. This method of registering a change in com-
petition resulting from a merger indicates that there is no problem here
of comparability or of uniqueness of results such as we faced in dealing
with concentration ratios. The effect of every horizontal merger is
measured in exactly the same way, and each possible combination of
percentages of the merging firms yields a quantitative reduction in
the measure. The so-called "defensive merger" which improves com-
petition is thus not recognized but must be proved as a special case.
This seems consistent with judicial treatment of this defense.32
As applied to trends in horizontal concentration the entropy measure
avoids the arbitrary determinations which characterized the concen-
tration ratios. The measure takes into account both the number of
firms and the percentages of market held by each firm; none are ex-
cluded from consideration. The result is that if the leading firms hold
a given total percentage of market and the number of firms dividing
the remainder increases, the measure will not remain fixed as in the
case of the concentration ratio but will increase reflecting the more
competitive situation.
In extreme cases this will lead to results which may at first seem
paradoxical. Assume for example a market divided between a 90 per
cent and a 10 per cent firm. The contribution of the 10 per cent firm
to the measure f(C) is 1/10 log (10). If the 10 per cent firm divides into
two 5 per cent firms the total contribution of the 5 per cent firms
becomes 1/10 log (20). Repeating the splitting process so that four
firms share 1/10 of the market raises the total contribution of the four
firms to 1/10 log (40). In general if n firms account for 1/10th of the
market, their contribution to f(C) is 1/10 log (10n). As n increases the
value of this expression increases without limit and, as a result, so does
the value of f(C). Thus even in a market dominated by a 90 per cent
firm, the entropy measure may still show a highly competitive market
provided the remaining 10 per cent is divided among a sufficiently
large number of firms.
32. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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Is this a paradoxical result? At first thought it may seem so since it
can be argued that a market dominated by a 90 per cent firm should
never be treated as highly competitive. This is probably true, but the
reason it is so depends on a factual assumption: a firm with less than
1 per cent of market cannot be an effective competitive force and con-
sequently a large group of firms whose share aggregates less than 10 per
cent cannot be effective competitors to a 90 per cent firm no matter
how large their number. But if very small firms were in fact significant
competitors there seems no reason to disregard their contribution to
the total degree of competitive activity. Thus there is reason to believe
that an increase in their number should indeed increase the total of
competitive behavior. The theoretical issue then is not whether small
firms should be taken into account, but what weight should be given
to them.33
It is worthwhile noting that in practical examples the entropy
measure does not give impossible results. In our 90 per cent-10 per
cent example, if one firm controls 10 per cent then C - 1.15. If the 10
per cent firm is split up into 1000 equal firms C rises only to approxi-
mately 2.5. To bring C up to 5 these 1000 firms would have to become
1,000,000; to bring C up to 10 they would have to become 10 billion.
The relative insensitivity of C to the presence of very small firms
makes the decision about which marginal firms to include less important
than when other measures are used.34 Nevertheless, other examples
might be cited (the facts in Von's perhaps present one of them) where
the value of the measure turns on the contribution of large numbers
of extremely small firms. In such cases it may be argued that the con-
tribution to the total level of competitive activity of these small firms
should be given even less importance than their size would indicate
and that the measure overestimates their significance by giving them
any weight at all.
It is important to recognize that such a cut-off would introduce an
entirely new principle of value, namely, a factor that applied solely to
extremely small firms. The contributions of large firms would still be
33. We do not overlook the possibility that in the case depicted in the example it
may be argued that a single 10 per cent firm might be more willing to take on a 90
per cent leader than would a I per cent firm. If this were so it could be argued that there
would be less competition and not more if the 10 per cent firm were split into ten 1
per cent firms. But this point of view overlooks the existence of competition among the
small firms and is most likely to be true with respect to competition with the leading
firm in pathological markets of the type illustrated by the example. For these reasons
we treat this possibility as an exception to rather than an attribute of the measure.
34. This problem and the not very satisfactory solution of "truncated" indexes is
discussed in Singer, supra note 18, at 86.
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taken seriously, but the contributions of small firms would be regarded
as irrelevant, however much they struggled for a share of the market.
It is obviously very difficult to make the judgment which this implies.
The critical size would probably have to depend on the nature of the
market, and its determination would present problems. These diffi-
culties suggest that the issue of effectiveness of competitive activity
must be determined as a factor separate from the entropy measure. In
the next section we consider briefly a measure which avoids an arbi-
trary cut-off by treating the competitive activity of small firms as less
significant than large ones and thus providing a "smooth" limit to the
contribution of smaller firms.
In applying the entropy measure to vertical integrations (either by
contract or merger) it is useful to consider the factor 1 /n as represent-
ing the extent of competitive activities of the firm in question and log
(n) as representing the degree of such activities. Thus for a firm which
controls half the customers in a market, represents the proportion
of customers affected by its competitive activities and log (2) represents
the degree or rate of such activities.
To the extent that a firm absorbs its customers by merger or ties
them with requirements contracts, competing firms find a segment of
the market shielded from them. Thus, if a firm controlling half a
market acquires 1 its customers, the firm's segment of market still
open to competitors would decline from to 1. To reflect this clo.
sure, we adopt the rule that when vertical mergers or requirements
contracts are involved, the factor 1/n now represents the proportion
of the firm's free customers to the total number of customers in the
market, while the factor log n continues to represent the degree or
rate of competitive activity of the tying firm. (Since 1/n and log n may
now vary independently, it is no longer technically correct to write
them both in terms of n because this implies a false relation between
them; we continue to do so, however, in order to avoid changing the
form of the entropy measure.)
A reduction in the proportion of the market which remains free is
not, however, the only anticompetitive consequence of vertical inte-
gration. Another possibility is that as a firm ties its customers and
assures itself a market vis-A-vis these customers, the impetus for com-
petitive activity in the free sector should diminish at least to some
extent. Thus, when applying the entropy measure to vertical integra-
tions, log n should be replaced by a function which decreases in value
as integration increases. But what are the limits to the decrease? When
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a firm ties all its customers should it be viewed as engaging in no
competitive activities and thus the replacement function equals zero?
Factually of course this would not be true since most "customers" in
these vertical acquisitions are distributors or processors who must
compete with distributors or processors of other firms. Even a firm
which has tied all of its distributor-customers must still act competi-
tively if they are to receive goods which can compete in the market.
The level of that activity will depend on a variety of factors relating
to the imperfections of the market on the distributor level.
These uncertainties deepen if we attempt to define the full shape of
the curve by which the replacement function should diminish as ver-
tical integration increases. In most situations, firms fight hard even
for the last percentage points of market. For this reason the decline in
the replacement function should be negligible until a very large per-
centage of the market is tied. Since most integrations are not even
substantially complete, and since it is difficult to postulate how the
replacement function should decrease, we ignore this effect. It is thus
assumed that a firm which engages in a vertical integration program
will not change its level of competitive activities-although the entropy
measure will decline because, in appropriate cases, the effect of such
activities will reach only the free customers. In considering vertical
mergers, we thus derive the two factors 1/n and log n from two dif-
ferent values of n. In evaluating 1/n we limit the market share of the
firm to its free customers; in evaluating log n we include all a firm's
customers.
This conception is also consistent with the probability measure Q.
A customer which is tied to a firm has probability 1 of not transferring
to another firm. To the extent customers are tied, Q is changed pro-
portionately in the way indicated.
Vertical integration always produces a decline in the entropy mea-
sure. If there are nine equal firms in a market and one firm ties half
its customers the measure declines from 9 to approximately 8.7. If
one firm ties all its customers the measure declines from 9 to 8.5. This
is greater than C for an eight-firm market, a result which is consistent
with the fact that the remaining firms would engage in a higher level
of competitive activity to prevent depredations by the firm whose cus-
tomers are completely tied. If each firm ties half its customers the mea-
sure declines from 9 to 3. This may seem a large change, but it should
be recalled that integration this extensive would be extremely unusual
and that the percentage foreclosure test used by the Court would itself
show at least a 50 per cent reduction on these facts.
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IV.
Two important assumptions made in deriving the entropy measure
were that (1) the level of a firm's competitive activity is a function
solely of its size-this led to the form of f(c) as a sum, and (2) small
firms should count in the sense that the measure should show an in-
crease without limit (although at a decreasing rate) as the number of
such firms increased-this led to the choice of log n. We found sup-
port for these assumptions because the same results were also produced
by independent derivations. And we suggested that the second assump-
tion might be necessary because of the difficulties in determining a
cutoff point after which firms less than a certain size would no longer
be deemed to contribute to competition. We recognize, however, that
the considerations which led to and support these choices do not elimi-
nate other possibilities and for this reason we consider briefly alter-
natives to each.
An alternative to the first assumption is to assume that the level of
a firm's competitive activity is determined not by its size, independent of
the market, but by its place in the market independent of its size. The
simplest way of doing this is to replace f(n) by the rank of the firm in
question. The largest firm has rank 1, the next rank 2, and so forth.
If two firms are equal in size, they must nonetheless be assigned suc-
cessive ranks. The rank of each firm is multiplied by its percentage
share of market and the products added as in the entropy measure. We
then double the grand total and subtract 1 to obtain L, the ordinal
measure of concentration. The purpose of the doubling and subtrac-
tion is to provide that if all firms are equal and there are n firms
then L = n as in the case of the entropy measure.











If two of these firms merge, then:
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L=2.20 X 2- 1 =3.4
A little algebra shows that the ordinal measure is closely related to
the Lorenz curve. In fact, L is just tvice the area under the curve
when the vertical scale is relative and the horizontal scale is absolute.
That is, the total height of the graph is taken as one unit, regardless
of the actual market size, but the total width is taken as equal to the
number of firms, so that each firm contributes one unit of width.s
If G is the value of the Gini coefficient measured in the usual way
and n is the number of firms, then L = (1 - G)n. If one wishes to base
a measure of economic concentration on the Lorenz curve, then L,
rather than G, is the appropriate measure. L measures both abso-
lute and relative concentration (G measures only changes in rela-
tive concentration) and in addition has the desirable property of chang-
ing only slightly as a result of the appearance or disappearance of an
extremely small firm. (G changes dramatically in that circumstance.)
Although the ordinal measure is a better index of market concen-
tration than the Gini coefficient, there is no reason to prefer it to the
entropy measure and some important reasons not to. First, the entropy
measure may be supported by the theoretical arguments we have given;
there are no such arguments to sustain the ordinal measure. The only
theoretical justification the ordinal measure may have is that it is re-
lated to the Lorenz curve which is familiar to economists. Second,
although the ordinal measure may seem easier to compute than the
entropy measure since the rank of a firm is more easily found than the
logarithm of its size, it is actually more difficult. For the labor of mul-
tiplication in computing C can be circumvented by using a readymade
table of 1/n log (n), whereas no readymade table for computing L is
possible since each firm's contribution depends on two quantities, its
85. The area under the Lorenz curve can be divided into horizontal slabs, each
bounded on the left by a diagonal element of the curve. If the firm that corresponds to
this diagonal element has a rank a and market share x, then the slab has vertical
thickness x and horizontal length varying from a to a- I at the top. Therefore the area
of the slab is (a- 2 )x. The total area under the graph is 2 (a- 1,)x .ax-Xx = X ax- V. Twice the area is 22 (ax) - , which by definition is equal to L.
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rank and size, which can vary separately. Third, the ordinal measure
appears to give excessive weight to small firms. In the 90 per cent-10
per cent example given earlier we have L = 1.10 when the 10 per cent
firm is undivided; L = 6.00 when the 10 per cent firm splits into 99
equal firms; and L = 51.0 when these 99 become 999. According to the
ordinal measure it is thus possible to have a low degree of concentra-
tion in a market dominated by a 90 per cent firm. As we have seen,
this is not practically possible if the entropy measure is used.
The second assumption is that the degree of competition increases
without limits as the number of small firms increases. An alternative
to this is a measure which never increases beyond a fixed limit, no
matter how large n becomes for a segment of the market. The simplest
such function which satisfies the requirement f(l) = 0 and which also
increases at a decreasing rate as n increases is:
1(n) = I - 1/n
This function leads to the remainder measure, so called because the
function f(n) for each firm is just the fraction of the market which it
does not control. Denoting this measure by R, we have:
f(R) = I 1/n f(n)
M l/n(1 - 1/n)
M 1/n - 1/n 2
Since I 1/n = 1 this yields:
f(R) = 1 - 1/n 2
Since f(n) = 1 -1/n then f(R) = 1 -l/IR. Substituting in the ex-
pression for f(R) we have:
I - 1I = I - I 1/n 2
IR = I I/n2
R is thus easy to compute. If all the firms are equal then lIR -
(n)(I/n 2) = 1/n or R = n as we required. If there are four firms in the
market with the sizes 40%, 20%, 20%, 20%, then I/IR = 0.402 + 0.202
+ 0.202 + 0.202 = 0.28; R = 3.57. (This may be compared with C =
3.78 and L = 3.40.)
Returning to the small firm problem which was our reason for con-
sidering R, in the 90 per cent-10 per cent example considered earlier
R = 1/0.82 = 1.22 if there are only two firms. If the 10 per cent firm
is split up into many small firms R never grows larger than 1/0.81 =
1.23, no matter how many small firms there are. R is thus extremely
insensitive to small firms. This is a major objection to its use as a
measure of trends in concentration. (Since R is the reciprocal of the
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Herfindahl index, see p. 688 supra, the objections to R would also
apply to the Herfindahl index.)
When all firms are equal in size, the measures C, L and R all equal
the number of firms. The concentration ratio is usually not expressed
in this way, although it obviously can be, and the remaining measures
were defined to produce this result. When firms differ in size only
slightly the measures differ only slightly. Usually C is the largest and
L the smallest. But as the number of small firms starts to grow the
situation changes. Then in order of increasing sensitivity to small firms
we have: the concentration ratio which remains unchanged; the re-
mainder measure R which increases but never by more than a small
fixed amount; the entropy measure C which may increase indefinitely
in theory but only a little in practice; and lastly the ordinal measure
L which may become very large both in theory and practice.
In the applications which follow we consider principally the entropy
measure since it is supported by theoretical considerations which the
others lack and since the values produced do not lead to results which
are obviously erroneous. But these other measures also merit consid-
eration and we shall give some comparative calculations for them in
footnotes.
V.
In applying the entropy measure it is not unusual to find that the
record affords an inadequate basis for an exact computation. Frequently
basic statistical information is incomplete even in an antitrust record
of thousands of pages. Our method of dealing with such gaps is to as-
sume a state of facts adverse to the Government since it carries the
burden of proof. We select a few examples to demonstrate the method
of computation and the information which the entropy measure makes
available.
In the Alcoa case, the Court found that two lines of commerce could
be differentiated: insulated aluminum conductors and a broader line
of insulated and bare aluminum conductors. 0 The significance of the
merger was not the same in these lines, and this difference turns out
to be meaningful for the choice of line problem.
Prior to the merger, the total contribution by Alcoa and Rome to
f(C) in the broader line was 0.179. After the merger, Alcoa's contribu-
tion became 0.156 decreasing f(C) from 0.891 to 0.868. Thus C de-
36. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
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clined from 7.7 to 7.35 as a result of the merger.87 This indicates a
rather small increase in a highly concentrated line of commerce.
In the line of insulated aluminum conductors, the total contribu-
tion of Alcoa and Rome to f(C) prior to the merger was 0.171. After
the merger Alcoa's contribution became 0.128, decreasing f(C) from





Insulated & Bare Aluminum 7.7 7.35
Insulated Aluminum 10.6 9.6
37. In 1958, shortly before the merger, the shares of the firms in the aluminum
conductor line and the corresponding values of 1/n f(n) were as follows:
ALUMINUM CONDUCTOR (BARE & INSULATED)







General Cable 6.0 0.073






8 Firms 3.3 0.079
21 Firms 99.9 0.891
Plaintiff's Exhibit 434, Record on Appeal at 2713-14.
38. In the line of insulated aluminum conductor the figures are as follows:
ALUMINUM CABLE (INSULATED)





General Cable 9.5 0.097
Essex 6.1 0.074
Olin Mathieson 5.3 0.068
Reynolds 4.8 0.063
Southwire 2.5 0.040
Firms 10-19 11.8 0.228
19 Firms 100.0 1.025
Plaintiff's Exhibit 436, Record on Appeal at 2517-18.
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We are now in a position to compare the effects of merger in the
two lines of commerce in a way which was not open to the litigants.
The entropy measure indicates that the wider line of aluminum con-
ductor was more concentrated than the line of insulated aluminum
conductor, but that both lines were highly concentrated. It also shows
that the merger was probably more significant both absolutely and
proportionately in the insulated line than in the wider line. This sug-
gests that the case could and should have been disposed of solely on
the basis of the effect on the insulated line. The Court's reliance on
the dubious broader line was unnecessary in light of the finding of
the entropy measure that the merger in the insulated line was probably
of greater significance.39
Manufacturers Hanover4 illustrates the use of the entropy measure
in resolving problems of stare decisis. The district court had held that
the decision in Philadelphia Bank afforded no basis for concluding
that the Manufacturers Hanover merger should also be held prima
facie unlawful. The court gave two reasons for its conclusion: first,
the share of the merged firms was 30 per cent in Philadelphia Bank
and only 14 per cent in Manufacturers Hanovor, and second, if the
merger were consummated, the merging banks in Philadelphia would
have a significantly larger share of market than their nearest com-
petitors, while in Manufacturers Hanover the merged banks would
have been only third in the New York metropolitan area.
These considerations are obviously relevant but not exhaustive. The
entropy measure provides a more systematic basis for comparison.
Prior to the merger in Philadelphia Bank, f(C) = 1.049; C = 12.73.
The merger of Philadelphia National Bank and Girard Trust Com-
pany reduced their contribution to f(C) by 0.105. After the merger
39. We have applied the ordinal measure L and the remainder measure R to this
case. The results are shown in this table.
Measure C L R
Line of Commerce Broad Narrow Broad Narrow Broad Narrowv
Before Merger 7.7 10.6 5.846 8.168 5.72 7.38
After Merger 7.35 9.6 5.558 7.412 5.50 6.8
Absolute Decrease 0.35 1.0 0.288 0.756 0.m 0.54
Per CentDecrease 4.6% 9.4% 4-9% 9.2% 3.8% 7.3%
The significance was "probably" greater in the narrow line because the exact meaning
of the change in C poses an economic question which the measure does not purport to
answer.
40. See note 8 supra.
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C = 8.79. Thus, as a result of the merger, C declined from 12.73 to
8.79. 4 1
Prior to the merger in Manufacturers Hanover, f(C) = 1.140; C -
13.8. The merger of Manufacturers Trust Co. and The Hanover Bank
reduced their contribution to f(C) by 0.044. After the merger f(C) =
1.096; C = 12.9. Thus, as a result of the merger, C declined from 13.8
to 12.9.42
41. The statistics in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963), are as follows:
DEPOSITS IN COMMERCIAL BANKS PHILADELPHIA METROPOLITAN AREA
Per Cent of Total
Deposits of 4
Bank Counties I In f(n)
The Philadelphia National Bank 21.3 .143
Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank 14.5 .122
35.8 .160
First Pennsylvania Banking 22.1 .145
Provident Tradesmens Bank 9.9 .100
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. 9.3 .096
Central-Penn National Bank 5.2 .067
Broad Street Trust Co. 2.9 .044
Liberty Real Estate Bank 2.0 .034
Montgomery Co. Bank & Trust Co. 1.8
Nine other commercial banks with
head offices in Phila. 3.2 .078
Fifteen other commercial banks with
head offices in Montgomery Co. 4.1 .105
Delaware County National Bank 1.6 .029
Nine commercial banks with head
offices in Bucks Co. 2.1 .055
Total 100.0 1.049
See Table 2, Record on Appeal at 2349. We have used the more elaborate data from the
record rather than the abbreviated data cited by the court.
42. The statistics in Manufacturers Hanover are as follows:
DEPOSITS IN COMMERCIAL BANKS: NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
Per Cent
Banks Ranked by Size of Assets Total Deposits Iln 1(n)
Chase Manhattan Bank 20.01% .140
First National City Bank 17.59 .133
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. 10.16 .101
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. 9.12 .095
Manufacturers Trust Co. 9.24 .096
Bankers Trust Co. 7.81 .089
Irving Trust Co. 5.33 .068
Hanover Bank 4.64 .062
Franklin National Bank 1.93 .033
Marine Midland Trust Co. 1.81 .032
Bank of New York 1.62 .029
Meadow Brook National Bank 1.42 .026
Table continued on page 711.
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Philadelphia National Bank 12.7 8.8
Manufacturers Hanover 13.8 12.9
The entropy measure indicates that the Philadelphia Bank market
was slightly more concentrated than the Manufacturers Hanover mar-
ket and that the merger in Philadelphia Bank appears more significant
than in Manufacturers Hanover. These results sustain the Court's con-
clusion that Manufacturers Hanover cannot be deemed a prima facie
case solely on the basis of the decision in Philadelphia Bank.
The facts in the Von's case43 can be used to illustrate the application
of the entropy measure to trends in concentration. In Von's, the deci-
sion apparently depended on two factors: (1) the reduction in the
number of firms in the periods prior to and following the merger, and
(2) the increase in size of the merging firms.
The Government did not introduce any evidence of the size break-
down of individual firms in 1948, ten years before the merger, but did
introduce evidence of percentage shares of groups of firms. Assuming
a distribution most favorable to the defendants, namely, that the firms
42. Continued
DEPOSITS IN COMMERCIAL BANKS: NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
Per Cent
Banks Ranked by Size of Assets Total Deposits lln f(n)
County Trust Co. 1.29 .024
Savings Bank Trust Co. 0.54 .012
Empire Trust Co. 0.52 .012
Grace National Bank 0.55 .012
United States Trust Co. of New York 0.50 .012
National Bank of Westchester 0.57 .013
Federation Bank & Trust Co. 0.53 .012
Commercial Bank of North America 0.45 .012
Sterling National Bank 9- Trust Co. 0.40 .009
First National City Trust Co. 0.82 .003
Trade Bank & Trust Co. 0.30 .003
Long Island Trust Co. 0.26 .007
Subtotal 97.05% .695
Total 48 Remaining Banks 2.95 .095
Total Al Banks 100.00% 1.140
43. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). See note 14.
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in each group were equal, for the year 1948, C = 985. 44 The principal
contribution was from very small firms. By any standards, this is a
highly competitive market.
For the year 1958 the Government put in more detailed statistics.
Since in making comparisons it would be misleading to use the more
general figures for 1948 and the more specific figures for 1958, we use
the more general figures for 1958 as well.45 Using these figures, for the
44.
GROCERY FIRMS IN LOS ANGELES-1948
Number of Firms Aggregate Share 1/n (n)
Firms 1-4 25.9 .308
Firms 5-8 7.8 .136
Firms 9-12 5.1 .183
Firms 13-16 2.8 .060
Firms 17-20 2.1 .048
Firms 21-6221 57.2 2.808
6221 99.9 2.993
See Record on Appeal at 231.
45.
GROCERY FIRMS IN LOS ANGELES-1958
Number of Firms Aggregate Share 1/n (n)
Firms 14 24.4 0.296
Firms 5-8 16.5 0.229
Firms 9-12 7.9 0.135
Firms 13-16 4.6 0.089
Firms 17-20 3.5 0.072
Firms 21-4741 43.1 1.741
4741 100.0 2.562
See Record at 2324, 2331. The figure for total firms is as of the end of 1960, the only
figure available.
DETAILED BREAKDOWN: GROCERY FIRMS IN LOS ANGELES-1958




Market Basket 4.4 .060
Thriftimart 4.4 .060
Shopping Bag 4.2 .058
Food Giant 3.6 .052
Alpha Beta 3.1 .017
Fox Markets 2.8 .043
Mayfair 2.0 .034
Firms 11-12 5.2 .082
Firms 13-16 4.6 .089
Firms 17-20 3.5 .072
Firms 21-4741 43.1 1.741
4741 100.0 2.564
See Record at 2329, 2331.
The result here is, as one would expect, close to the estimate based on the more
general data. The fact that C is larger than if computed on the more general data is due
to discrepancies between the general and particular data for 1958.
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year 1958, C = 364. Although the decline over the decade was evi-
dently substantial, the market, in 1958, was still highly competitive.
In order to determine the effect of the merger it is necessary to
compute the shares of the individual firms. This computation, based
on the detailed breakdown, shows that before the merger f(C) = 2.564;
C = 367. The merger of Von's and Shopping Bag reduced C from 367
to 340 equal firms. Thus, both before and after the merger, the market
remained highly competitive. By giving significant weight to large
numbers of small firms the entropy measure leads to results which do
not sustain the Government's claim that the market in Von's had be-
come so highly concentrated that it "was approaching oligopoly. '40 If
the evidence of the entropy measure is accepted, Von's is an "incipi-
ency" case with a vengeance. 47
VI.
By holding that evidence of the number and sizes of firms in a
market is sometimes alone sufficient for the Government's case, the
Court has assigned a crucial role to such evidence and shifted the battle
over the use of statistics in Section 7 proceedings. Judges must now
decide not whether to rely solely on statistical evidence, but when to
do so. It has been our thesis that the methods presently used to mea-
sure economic concentration-principalUy concentration ratios-are
46. Brief for the United States at 28.
The three measures we have derived yield very different results when applied to the
facts in Von's. From the individual firm sizes we obtain L = 1750 before the merger and
L = 1748 after; R = 40.4 before and 34.9 after. The measures differ substantially because
they attach different relative importance to large and small firms. The merger affects only
the larger firms, and therefore has little effect on L which is large because of the large
total number of firms. But it has a strong effect on R, which depends almost exclusively
on the larger firms.
We may compare the effect of this merger with that of an imaginary one in which
roughly 400 of the small firms are absorbed by the larger ones. This would also reduce
C from 367 to roughly 340. But R would fall only to 40.0 remaining almost unchanged. L,
however, would drop by about 100. These examples demonstrate that C is intermediate
between L and R in its weighting of small firms.
47. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 901 (1966), also appears to be an
incipiency case-although less extreme than Von's. The record in Pabst was uniquely
complete. It showed the market share percentage of every firm down to .001 per cent for
the years 1958 through 1961. Record on Appeal at 170-84. On the basis of these statistics
the Court found that the three-year period immediately following the merger had been
marked by a continuing trend toward concentration. The calculations of the entropy
measure are too long to reproduce here, but they show that in 1958 C declined from 66
to 64 as a result of the merger, and that the trend to concentration relied on by the
Court had by 1961 reduced C to 51. This would appear to be a substantial decline
although the market is evidently still highly competitive. For a discussion of Pabst's
market share before and after the merger, see note 14 supra.
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not well suited to resolve this and other issues which the Court's rule
has made prominent.
In cases arising under the amended Section 7, the Court has
repeatedly relied in its analysis of statistics on the results in prior
cases. Since comparisons of this sort are a primary analytic tool, the
method used to express the degree of concentration should facilitate
them. But as we have seen, there are only limited factual situations
in which concentration ratios permit valid and adequate comparisons.
In Manufacturers Hanover comparison was not possible, while in
Von's and Pabst the change in the concentration ratio reflected a par-
ticular, and relatively less important, aspect of market changes. Com-
parability may be improved by relying on a single factor, such as the
sizes of the merging firms, but only at the cost of disregarding market
data which may be highly relevant. And the use of such artificially
limited measures emphasizes the economic unreality of the Court's
reliance on statistics.
The lack of comparability is but the prelude to a deeper problem.
When comparisons are sought with statistics from other industries, or
where stare decisis does not dictate the answer, a court must make a
decision concerning the economic significance of the statistics. Since
the economic problem is complex, some simplification or reduction is
essential. But concentration ratios are of little help in this regard be-
cause the reduction they effect is purely statistical. It is because no
theory of competitive behavior underlies the concentration ratio that
the Court, in the leading Section 7 cases, has been unable to supply a
reasoned connection between its economic judgments and the statis-
tical basis on which they rest.
A measure in the form of a translation into equal-firm markets would
be better suited to implement the Court's view. A translation measure
simplifies the economic problem by making an economic statement:
the level of competitive activities of the market under consideration
is equivalent to that of a market with a certain number of equal firms.
This would seem to be a better form in which to make the ultimate
economic judgment, even though the results of the measure cannot
determine that judgment. A court must still make a finding concern-
ing the degree of competition to be anticipated for the equivalent
equal-firm markets before and after the merger and decide whether the
change should be viewed as substantial. But by expressing the statistics
in terms of equal-firm markets a court's task may be simplified. It also
seems more reasonable to conclude, as the Court has done without
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using this measure, that the greater the change in the equal-firm mea-
sure occasioned by a merger the less relevant other economic infor-
mation becomes, until, finally, the statistical evidence alone is sufficient
for a prima facie case. Once the statistics are cast in the form of an
economic statement, the role of other economic evidence becomes-
logically as well as legally-complementary to this primary evidence.
The foregoing assumes that the translation measure embodies an
economic truth. What assurance do we have that a given market has
the same degree of competitive activity as a market consisting of n
equal firms? The general problem is that economic theory "cannot yet
sustain reliable predictions concerning the impact on market behavior
of any but the most sweeping mergers. '48 The most that can be said
is that if a measure is egregiously wrong, a majority of economists
would believe its statements false; but even then there is probably no
empirical or theoretical test of these opinions.
The absence of provability is not fatal to the usefulness of a trans-
lation measure. Any measure on which comparisons rest depends on
some equally unprovable assumptions. The simple decision to consider
solely the sizes of the merging firms depends on the unverifiable hypoth-
esis that the rest of the market is irrelevant. So the choice is not whether
to use unprovable assumptions, but which ones to use. The answer is
that we should test and use those assumptions which lead to a measure
useful in form. Of course the assumptions should be economically
plausible and should be plainly stated to permit debate and correction.
The assumptions used in deriving the entropy measure have certain
arbitrary elements but they seem to us to be within a range of reason-
ableness and they or some equally unprovable alternatives are neces-
sary to construct any translation measure.
With respect to the "competitive activities" derivation, the choice of
the logarithmic functions seems preferable to its rivals, but the choice
of log n over other logarithmic functions is necessarily arbitrary. Log
n was chosen because this is the simplest of the log functions and we
have no economic basis for a different, more complicated, choice. The
log function also turns out to be consistent with the results of other
derivations. The independence hypothesis-the assumption that a
firm's level of competitive activity is a function solely of its size-was
again a choice based on considerations of simplicity. For we know of
48. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and The Merging of Law and Economics, 74
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no way to resolve the complex choices involved in the contrary assump-
tion that the rate of competitive activity is dependent on the shape
of the entire market, or a part of it.
With respect to the "permutations" derivation, the assumption that
customer permutation is a valid measure of competition is undoubtedly
novel. The probability of customer transfer would seem related to com-
petitive activity, and permutations are of importance if transfers are
considered in terms of their probability. The fact that the number of
permutations is inversely proportional to the probability (as we have
computed it) that no customer would change allegiance lends support
to the use of the number of permutations as a measure of the prob-
ability of customer transfer. The "probability" derivation itself rests
on the independence hypothesis and on our determination that a firm's
probability of holding its customers is most likely to be proportional
to its size.
The test of these assumptions cannot be their eternal truth, but
whether plausible alternatives can be framed which lead to essentially
different results. We have illustrated the testing process by proposing
alternatives to the independence hypothesis and the choice of the log
function. These yield results which seem less in accord with economic
ideas than the entropy measure. Other choices may yield better results.
The problems of constructing a measure reflect the larger fact that
the law has established a test involving economic prediction which in
most cases will remain beyond the reach of economic science. These
uncertainties will deepen if the Government extends its antitrust en-
forcement program to the full range apparently sanctioned by the
Court's recent decisions. A more inclusive program of this type will
present the enforcing agencies and the courts with much closer ques-
tions than those with which they have dealt so far. More than ever,
the weaknesses, gaps and inadequacies of economic prediction will re-
veal the problems inherent in applying the statutory standard. More
than ever, the Court will have to take refuge in the fact that Congress
was dealing "with probabilities and not certainties" and that "mergers
with a probable anti-competitive effect were to be proscribed by this
Act."
Even within the permissive standard of probabilities, it is obvious
that the entropy measure itself is not an end to the problem of mea-
suring concentration for the Clayton Act any more than a mercator
or polar projection is an end to map making. Factors may be added-
such as the degree of stability of market structure-which would per-
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haps lead to greater refinement. Our purpose has not been to give a
complete answer to these problems, but to demonstrate the first result
of an approach which seeks to coordinate the problems of measure-
ment with the purposes of the law.
